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INTRODUCTION
Racial integration is often cast as irrelevant to the contemporary project of
ensuring racial equity in education. The day after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District No. 1,1 holding unconstitutional the
voluntary racial integration programs in Seattle, Washington and Jefferson
County, Kentucky, a prominent popular commentator urged the public not to
“mourn Brown v. Board of Education”: Brown should be praised, Juan Williams
argued, but ultimately “bur[ied].”2 Desegregation is irrelevant to addressing the
high dropout rates of black and Latino high school students, or the racial and
ethnic achievement gap, Williams contended, both because of the futility of
achieving integration (given current patterns of residential segregation), and
because racial malice could no longer explain the inferior quality of schooling for

† Associate Professor, Columbia Law School. This paper builds on remarks that I made at
Moving Education Forward, the Duke Forum for Law & Social Change conference on educational equity
held on February 13, 2009. I am indebted to Aslihan Bulut of the Columbia Law Library, Diana Blank,
Adia Gross, and Jessica Leinwand for their wonderful research assistance, and to Chinh Le for his
thoughtful comments and suggestions. In addition, I am very grateful to the Clifford Chance
Diversity Thought Leadership Program for funding part of the research for this paper.
1. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
2. Juan Williams, Don’t Mourn Brown v. Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/opinion/29williams.html.

19

Johnson_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

20 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

6/22/2009 3:48:31 PM

Vol. 1:19 2009

minority children. Arguments for integration that depend on the diversity
rationale—that integration prepares students to live and work in a pluralistic
society—were “spent,” Williams argued.3 Rather, the focus should be on
providing students the core skills necessary to participate in the global
economy.4
These comments raise familiar criticisms about racial integration: that it is
neither achievable nor material to the current important questions in education.5
Belief in the futility of the quest for integration certainly derives support from
demographic realities. Current levels of school segregation remain high for both
blacks and Latinos, and progress since the 1970s has been slowing.6 Academic
commentators have long debated the extent to which racial integration remedies,
such as mandatory school assignments and busing, have been
counterproductive, hastening white flight and the ultimate resegregation of
schools.7 And, even apart from the debates about the unintended effects of racebased school assignment policies, most commentators agree that post-war
demographic changes cemented by the 1970s and 1980s led to increased
migration of white Americans from the cities to the suburbs,8 which made
desegregation less possible in many communities, and thus less relevant to
policy debates about improving education.9 Moreover, in a series of decisions in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Supreme Court articulated standards that
made it easier for school districts to dismantle court-ordered desegregation
plans.10

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation Policy: Looking Past the
Schools to Understand Them, 28 REV. RES. EDU. 57, 57–58 (2004) (discussing increased emphasis on
standards based reforms and a decreasing emphasis on poverty, inequality and segregation in
debates on educational reform) [hereinafter How Society Failed School Desegregation].
6. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 9–10 (2006) (documenting
growing patterns of racial isolation for blacks and Latinos in the 1990s through the 2003–04 school
year), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/Racial_Transformation.pdf.
7. Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION
314–18 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996) [hereinafter DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION]
(describing how arguments about white flight to the suburbs were used to defeat school
desegregation policies); see Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos and
Unequal Education, in id. at 61–62 (attributing decrease in white public school enrollment to trends in
birth rates).
8. Much evidence shows that these post-war changes are not themselves race-neutral but were
the result of federal and state housing policy as well as private discrimination and choices. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 42–57 (1993) (detailing the role of private
discrimination and state and federal policy in creating the ghetto in the post-World War Two era);
KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 190–230
(1987) (describing how government policies and subsidies promoted residential segregation,
suburbanization, and ghettoization).
9. The Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), rendered it difficult, if not
practically impossible, to launch desegregation efforts across city-suburban district lines, thus taking
meaningful racial integration off the map in a number of metropolitan areas.
10. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of the City of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
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Questioning integration’s connection to improving educational outcomes
has a similarly long history. The common account, which was expressed by
Justice Thomas in a series of desegregation decisions in the 1980s and 1990s and
again in Parents Involved, is that desegregation has not produced good
educational outcomes for minority students.11 The tepid academic gains of black
students in the early years of school integration (measured by standardized tests
in reading and math) seem to support this account.12 With this evidence of
limited achievement gains, Justice Thomas could skeptically characterize
integration as intended primarily to erase the psychological harm of segregation,
a characterization that, of course, has roots in the psychological evidence that
undergirds the Brown decision.13 As one moved further from legalized
segregation, psychological harm seemed less salient and, in a reversal from
Brown, a rationale that is even denigrating to black children, as Justice Thomas
has suggested.14
Even some integration proponents seem less swayed by the academic
benefits than the “citizenship” benefits of Brown—that integration helps prepare

11. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Moreover, there simply is no
conclusive evidence that desegregation either has sparked a permanent jump in the achievement
scores of black children, or has remedied any psychological feelings of inferiority black
schoolchildren might have had.”).
12. Initial post-Brown data showed only modest positive effects of desegregation on reading
scores of minority students and no improvement in minority math scores. See, e.g., Laurence A.
Bradley & Gifford W. Bradley, The Academic Achievement of Black Students in Desegregated Schools: A
Critical Review, 47 REV. EDUC. RES. 399 (1977); NANCY HOYT ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION:
OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN (1975); Edgar G. Epps, The Impact of School Desegregation on Aspirations, SelfConcepts and Other Aspects of Personality, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 300 (1975); but see Crain &
Mahard, Desegregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17
(1978); Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, The Effect of Research Methodology on DesegregationAchievement Studies: A Meta-Analysis, 88 AM. J. OF SOC. 839 (1983). Although the gap between black
and white test scores has narrowed over the past two decades, some studies argue that this resulted
more from gains in the socioeconomic status of black families than from desegregation. See David J.
Armor, Why is Black Educational Achievement Rising?, 108 PUB. INT. 65, 77–79 (1992).
13. That social evidence about the harm of segregation centered on psychological effects has
over the years since Brown been a particular subject of criticism by legal commentators who have
argued that the social science evidence was weak, and that the resort to psychology was unnecessary
because the social meaning of segregation was well-understood. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn,
Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157–58 (1955) (“I would not have the constitutional rights of
Negroes—or of other Americans—rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scientific
demonstrations in these records.”); Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69
YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (arguing that the purpose and impact of segregation in the southern regional
culture were matters of common notoriety, “matters not so much for judicial notice as for the
background knowledge of educated men who live in the world”). Several commentators have argued
that the Court should have more explicitly focused on the role of segregation in perpetuating racial
caste and hierarchy, see, e.g., id. at 429–30, or in denying blacks equal citizenship, see generally
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION (1989).
14. As Justice Thomas stated in Jenkins: “Given that desegregation has not produced the
predicted leaps forward in black educational achievement, there is no reason to think that black
students cannot learn as well when surrounded by members of their own race as when they are in an
integrated environment.” 515 U.S. at 121–22 (Thomas, J., concurring). For an account of broader
criticisms of integration, see Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261, 265–68, 269–72
(2006).
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students to live in a pluralistic society and reduces prejudice.15 Some of these
characterizations are no doubt strategic. With the Court’s acceptance of the
diversity rationale for higher education affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger,16
voluntary integration in primary and secondary education might have seemed to
depend on a compelling interest akin to the diversity rationale. Yet, even apart
from strategic considerations, integration’s central good often resounds in
reducing prejudice and improving citizenship in a diverse society. James Ryan
recently noted that the Court’s decision in Parents Involved would have little
effect on educational policy “on the ground” because few school systems have
integration plans and most have “moved on” to questions such as school
funding, choice, and standards.17 The loss wreaked by Parents Involved, Professor
Ryan noted, would be to the notion that schools have any role to play in
preparing students for citizenship in a pluralistic society.18
If racial school integration is to be buried, let it not be without a proper
eulogy.19 Parents Involved, if not spelling racial integration’s doom, at least
renders it more difficult to attain. Yet behind Parents Involved is an account that
reveals that racial integration is neither entirely futile nor irrelevant to questions
of educational equity. The arguments of futility given the current patterns of
suburban–urban residential segregation are entirely reasonable. And yet,
Jefferson County, Kentucky—one of the school districts at issue in the voluntary
integration cases before the Supreme Court—is a strange place to make an
argument about school integration’s futility, because Jefferson County has long
been one of school integration’s relative successes. This success lies in the
regional, metropolitan nature of the school desegregation and integration plan—
the kind of plan that has always augured the most success for school
integration20 and which contains the potential to alter the deeply racialized living
patterns that make school assignment policies necessary. Moreover, the story of
Jefferson County shows how mandatory court orders, federal coercion, local
politics, and sustained community mobilization operated to transform a school
system from a de jure system of segregation to one of relative integration.

15. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131,
132, 142–43 (2007) (stating that “[t]he defense of integration has always been on surer footing when
one also considers its social benefits—the ways in which integration can break down or prevent
stereotypes and prejudice, lead to long-term relationships across racial and ethnic boundaries, and
increase the possibility that students will continue to seek out integrated colleges, workplaces, and
neighborhoods”) [hereinafter Voluntary Integration]; Erica Frankenberg, Introduction: School
Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL
DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 13–16 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007) (discussing
extensive research focusing on academic benefits of desegregation which showed only modest gains
in contrast to much more positive research documenting social and developmental benefits of
integrated schools).
16. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
17. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 132.
18. Id.
19. With apologies to Justice Stevens. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not be without a
eulogy.”).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 84–86.

Johnson_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

6/22/2009 3:48:31 PM

INTEGRATION, RECONSTRUCTED

23

In addition, the plaintiffs and their allies in Parents Involved argued that
integration not only serves to diminish racial and ethnic prejudice, and to
enhance citizenship, but promotes racial equity in schooling and beyond.21 As
will be shown below, Parents Involved contained the empirical evidence that
racial integration improves the short-term and long-term education prospects for
minority students. The evidence in Parents Involved centered not on stigmatic or
psychological harm, but on the claim that racially isolated schools are almost
necessarily schools with high levels of concentrated poverty affecting
educational achievement (through the production of poor quality schools) and
ultimately social mobility.22 While at first glance this may appear to be an
argument less about race than about class or poverty, the empirical claims
depended on the complex interplay between race and class. Concentrated
poverty is always primarily concentrated minority poverty, and the harms that
flow to “racially isolated” schools depend not just on their poverty status but on
their minority status.23
To argue for integration’s benefits, plaintiffs and their allies depended not
simply on increasing minority access to the financial resources of predominantly
white communities—an argument that inevitably suggests equalization or
upgrading of resources in minority schools as an alternative to integration (and
may be less than compelling given well-known facts about how much many
urban systems spend). Plaintiffs and their amici argued that integration not only
provides minority students with access to middle-class schools, but with the less
tangible networks of opportunity that attend those schools: peers with new skills,
experiences, and expectations for their own achievement; middle-class parents
with greater resources for school involvement; familiarity with integrated
settings that can create greater comfort in integrated and predominantly white
settings.24 This data is related to education’s democratizing function, but in a
way that speaks to the core issue of equality: for this data also suggests that if
integrated learning can break down racial stereotypes and bias, it may alter
public policy by generating greater concern about racial inequality, and
alleviating the plight of racial minorities.25
Neither the empirical evidence nor the plaintiff’s account of Jefferson
County’s integration journey was enough to secure five votes for sustaining the
voluntary integration programs at issue in Parents Involved. Much of the case
rested on the Justices’ respective views on the constitutionality of explicit racial
classifications, and most of the Justices’ positions on that question were wellknown from prior affirmative action jurisprudence.26 But examining Parents

21. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 120–36 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); see
James E. Ryan, The Limited Utility of Social Science in School Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659,
1689–90 (2003) (arguing that the social science in support of school integration was too equivocal to
alter the Justices’ normative views on the constitutionality of race-conscious government action). In
suggesting that the data was equivocal however, Ryan was mostly speaking about data on the shortterm effects of desegregation on minority achievement. See id.
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Involved for what it reveals about integration’s relevance to contemporary
questions of racial inequality is not offered simply to produce a eulogy. Rather,
an examination of this evidence suggests the terms on which racial integration
might retain its relevance: not merely to result in cosmetic changes in the levels
of school segregation, but as a meaningful attempt to alter both the short-term
and long-term structural arrangements that reproduce racial inequity. Parents
Involved leaves some constitutional space for consideration of voluntary
integration in schools, through race neutral and race conscious means.27 In
addition, housing law and policy can also serve to promote residential
segregation, with possibilities for integration in schools.28 The question is
whether integration should remain on the policy agenda, and for what reason.
This article examines Parents Involved for the light it sheds on integration’s
continuing relevance to educational and social equity. Part I examines the story
of school integration in Jefferson County and shows how this largely successful
metropolitan integration plan challenges claims of racial integration’s futility.
Part II puts forward the empirical evidence that plaintiffs in Parents Involved used
in seeking to establish that school boards have a compelling interest in
promoting racial integration and avoiding the harm of racially isolated schools.
This part argues that the empirical case for racial integration, while not without
limitations, moves beyond stigmatization, psychological harm, and the social
meaning of segregation, and links integration to equity on the dimensions of
school quality and social mobility. This part concludes by examining how
empirical arguments might inform integration’s future, which I contend is
possible primarily through close linkages between housing and school policy.
The article concludes by acknowledging that many questions remain
unanswered about integration’s future role in social policy, but that compelling
arguments exist for not wholly abandoning the integration project.
I. PAEAN FOR JEFFERSON COUNTY
School integration’s failures are often overstated, but several commentators
have noted its successes. Professor James Liebman has argued that, despite
conventional wisdom to the contrary, desegregation lawsuits were successful in
a large number of school districts.29 Similarly, Professors Jennifer Hochschild and
Nathan Scovronick have noted that school integration was, “on balance, an
27. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2792 (2007) (stating that school boards may pursue
integration through “race conscious” measures such as “strategic site selection of new schools,
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating
resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking
enrollments, performance and other statistics by race”); cf. American Civil Rights Foundation v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 172 Cal.App.4th 207, 222 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 2009) (holding that student
assignment “which aims to achieve social diversity by using neighborhood demographics when
assigning students to Schools” did not discriminate or grant preferential treatment on the basis of
race).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 160–67.
29. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1467 (1990) (noting desegregation success stories in Buffalo, Columbus, Dayton,
Denver, Minneapolis, St. Louis, San Diego, and Wilmington-New Castle, Charlotte-Mecklenburg,
Greenville, Jacksonville, Nashville-Davidson, and Tampa-St. Petersburg, as well as
Louisville/Jefferson County).
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educational success,” but that “mandatory desegregation was a political
failure.”30 Jefferson County is one such location of relative success in terms of
levels of stable integration achieved, but also, arguably, of political success as
measured by eventual political acceptance of integration remedies. Significantly,
Jefferson County provides a better lesson than Seattle School District, whose
desegregation efforts were always limited in their scope.31
Home to the City of Louisville and its surrounding suburbs, Jefferson
County was for twenty-five years subject to court-ordered desegregation after its
post-Brown integration efforts were deemed constitutionally inadequate by a
federal court.32 As discussed below, the initial desegregation lawsuit and, in
particular, the prospect of an adverse court ruling prompted the city’s school
system to merge with that of the surrounding county. Subsequently, the district
court ordered county-wide desegregation involving rezoning schools,
introducing magnet schools, and reassigning students (including the use of
busing). Initially, the plan was strongly opposed by many whites, as well as
some portions of the African-American community, but over time, opposition
died down and Jefferson County was soon touted as a model of school
integration.33
As will be discussed, Jefferson County’s experience is instructive on the
conditions conducive to successful integration, including: the county-wide
nature of the plan, which decreased the possibility of white flight; the active
involvement by intermediary organizations—human rights commissions and
parent groups in particular—who monitored the school district’s progress and
compliance with court-orders, implemented their own reform strategies, and
sustained a constituency for change; the significant work of governments and
nonprofits to encourage housing integration, which had some effect on
decreasing the need for student reassignment; and, eventually, the inclusion of
“school choice” elements into the integration plan. Even after the mandatory
desegregation order was lifted in 2001, Jefferson County continued its integration
efforts, modifying the plan to minimize transportation of students, and to
increase choice.
A. History
The Jefferson County school district, which encompasses the city of
Louisville and its surrounding suburbs, has long struggled with the question of
integration in its primary and secondary schools. Until the Brown decision,
Kentucky mandated racially separate schools.34 After Brown, Kentucky officials

30. JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD & NATHAN SCOVRONICK, THE AMERICAN DREAM AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 29 (2003).
31. For a history of school integration efforts in Seattle, see generally Parents Involved in Cmty.
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2005); FRANK HANAWALT & ROBERT L.
WILLIAMS, THE HISTORY OF DESEGREGATION IN SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1954–1981 (1981).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 45–51.
33. See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 29; Liebman, supra note 29, at 1467.
34. See OMER CARMICHAEL & WELDON JAMES, THE LOUISVILLE STORY 39–42 (1957).
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ordered the end of a dual school system.35 Kentucky’s approach contrasted with
the massive resistance launched by many southern states.36 While segregation
and racial subjugation thrived in Kentucky,37 by history and temperament the
state was characterized by less overt racial hostility than many other southern
states, and the City of Louisville in particular was known for its relative
liberalism.38 After the Brown decision, the Louisville school system conducted a
year-long community campaign to ready parents and civic and community
leaders for desegregation, and set September 1956 as the date for beginning
desegregation.39 In 1956, Louisville launched a plan to abolish the prior dual
school system, which required redistricting of elementary and middle schools
and the making of student assignments without regard to race.40 However, like
many other southern school systems, the plan included a “free choice” element,
liberally permitting transfers out of assigned schools.41 The plan met with initial
criticism from the black community for its delayed start and “free choice”
aspects,42 as well as some organized opposition by whites resistant to any form of
racial integration.43 Yet in its first year, the Louisville plan could report some
success: about half of all black students were attending integrated schools, and
only eighteen percent of whites were in all white schools (with the strong caveat
that an “integrated” school might contain as few as one student from another
race).44
This first desegregation effort ultimately failed to achieve stable integration,
primarily due to the free choice and transfer policies, as well as demographic
changes in housing patterns and white flight: by the early 1970s the schools were

35. Id. at 45–49.
36. See id. at 3–4, 45–47 (describing Kentucky and Louisville’s quiet acceptance of the court’s
decision in Brown).
37. See, e.g., Scott Cummings & Michael Price, Race Relations and Public Policy in Louisville:
Historical Development of an Urban Underclass, 27 J. BLACK STUD. 615, 615–17 (1997) (describing
Kentucky and Louisville’s segregationist history and policies).
38. See, e.g., Benjamin Muse, Louisville, 4–5, 7 (June 17, 1964) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) (noting, perhaps too rosily, that “Louisville has long been free from the type of
demagogic appeal to race prejudice which has plagued many southern cities” and attributing this to
Louisville’s “tolerance” and spirit of “liberalism”); CARMICHAEL & JAMES, supra note 34, at 14
(discussing Louisville’s “climate of tolerance or live-and-let-live”); see also id. at 26 (“[I]n a decade of
great changes in racial relations largely decreed by the courts, Louisville in some cases ‘read the
handwriting on the wall’ and acted without legal compulsion, in one or two others proceeded
without enthusiasm but also without disaster to comply with the law.”). To be sure, this
characterization is only relative: Louisville resisted full equality for blacks in many areas and black
gains in civil rights were the hard-fought result of litigation and protest. See, e.g., Cummings & Price,
supra note 37, at 632–34.
39. See CARMICHAEL & JAMES, supra note 34, at 49–70 (describing efforts conducted with parent
groups, civic leaders, the media, business and religious organizations); id. at 82, 84 (describing the
target date).
40. See id. at 84–85.
41. See id. at 85–86.
42. See id. at 82, 86.
43. See id. at 90–91.
44. See id. at 118–20 (reporting statistics on integration in Louisville during the 1956–57 academic
school year).
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once again segregated.45 In 1971, the Kentucky Chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and Louisville Legal Aid brought suit against Jefferson
County in federal district court to require desegregation of the schools.46 In 1972,
the ACLU and the Louisville Chapter of the NAACP brought a similar challenge
in federal district court against the City of Louisville.47 As the cases were being
litigated and a desegregation plan appeared imminent, the State Board of
Education voted to merge the Louisville and Jefferson County school systems,
effective April 1975.48 The impetus for merger was, at least in part, the city’s fear
that mandatory desegregation of the city system alone would lead to the outmigration of whites to county schools.49
In July 1975, the district court ultimately issued a county-wide
desegregation order for the school year, beginning on September 4.50 The
desegregation plan required the Jefferson County Public School System (JCPS) to
bus about 11,000 white children to predominantly black schools and 11,000 black
children to predominantly white schools; ordered redrawing of attendance zones
to create “clusters” to group predominantly white schools with predominantly
black schools; and, mandated racial guidelines of no less than 14% but no more
than 23% black enrollment in JCPS secondary schools and between 12% and 40%
black enrollment in elementary schools (this was later changed to between 16%
and 35% black enrollment for secondary schools and between 16% and 40% for
elementary schools).51
As in many cities, the Jefferson County desegregation plan met with
virulent, and often violent, opposition, mostly from whites throughout the
county, requiring for some time the deployment of one thousand national
45. See Marilyn O’Dell, Desegregation Policies In Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky—1956–
1985 31–32, 36–38 (May 1987) (unpublished dissertation on file with author); KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, LOUISVILLE SCHOOL SYSTEM RETREATS TO SEGREGATION (1972); KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOLS—EXCEPT LOUISVILLE—DESEGREGATE SCHOOLS (1972). By 1969, more than
half the city’s schools were either 95 percent black or 95 percent white, and the City in 1971 came
under investigation by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare for its segregated
schools. See GEORGE K. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., JEFFERSON COUNTY EDUCATION CONSORTIUM, THE
IMPACT OF COURT ORDERED DESEGREGATION ON STUDENT ENROLLMENT AND RESIDENTIAL PATTERNS
IN THE JEFFERSON COUNTY KENTUCKY PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT, FINAL REPORT 19 (1978).
46. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Gordon, 521 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1975); Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Newburg Area
Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson County, 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973).
47. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 35–36 (describing suit by the KCLU and the NAACP).
48. See id. at 47–49 (detailing state merger decision); Martin M. Perley, The Louisville Story,
INTEGRATED EDUC., Nov.–Dec., 1975, at 11. Prior to this order, the City had sought merger to address
revenue shortfalls due to a shrinking tax base and population loss. See id. at 14; see also O’Dell, supra
note 45, at 20–27 (describing revenue problems and merger proposals of the late 1960s). In addition,
the district court judge in the City of Louisville case had ordered the merger of the school systems in
a July 1974 order, which was reversed on appeal in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), which held that interdistrict remedies could not be ordered without a
specific showing of an interdistrict violation.
49. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 20–21; O’Dell, supra note 45, at 20–21.
50. See Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1976) (affirming district court’s
desegregation order).
51. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 50; KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SCHOOL AND HOUSING
DESEGREGATION ARE WORKING TOGETHER IN LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY 1975–1983 4 (1983)
[hereinafter SCHOOL AND HOUSING].
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guardsmen and four hundred state troopers to maintain order.52 The Louisville
and Jefferson County political leadership had expressed their opposition to
busing, and though they agreed to comply with the law, by some accounts they
failed to take leadership to ensure peaceful desegregation.53
While the opposition ultimately subsided, success of the desegregation plan
in the early years was mixed. Some studies showed that the school desegregation
plan led to white residential flight out of Jefferson County, and declining public
school enrollment of white students as parents moved their children to private or
parochial schools.54 Other studies noted increased housing desegregation as a
result of the desegregation plan’s exemption from busing for residents who
made pro-integrative moves, and the County’s use of the federal section 8
Housing Assistance voucher program to place black families into suburban
communities.55 The best read of the data suggests that there might have been an
initial period of white flight, but the level of flight dissipated by the late 1970s.56
By most measures, in 1980 JCPS was one of the most desegregated school
systems in the country, and black students had made striking academic gains as
measured by achievement scores in math and reading.57 In subsequent years,
there were indicia of resegregation of parts of the school system, and indicia of
failure to make sufficient gains in faculty and staff desegregation.58
While the plan was not perfect, for the most part stable integration was
achieved in many JCPS schools.59 And significantly, the integration program
gained community support. In 1991, the Jefferson County School superintendent
proposed dismantling elementary school desegregation.60 While some leaders
and citizens, both black and white, supported an end to busing and mandatory
school assignment policies, there was sufficiently strong opposition from
community groups, parents, and the teachers’ union that the plan was

52. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 65–67 (describing how buses were pelted with rocks and bricks,
some schools experienced bomb threats, and city made over two hundred arrests in the first few days
of desegregation); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 12, 13 (describing marches opposing
desegregation plan which attracted as many as 2,500 people, and protestors meeting buses with
“brickbats and bottles”); J.M. Wines, Busing: 5 Years Later, COURIER-JOURNAL, May 12, 1980, at 1, 4.
53. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 64–65, 90–91.
54. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 45, at 66, 98–99. It was less clear whether these moves
were due to the desegregation plan. The birth rate also declined in the County. Id. at 98. The decline
in public school enrollment coincided with the implementation of the desegregation plan and those
who left disclaimed that anti-black animus had affected their decisions to move, instead claiming
concerns about the quality of the schools. See id. at 79–83, 99–100.
55. See KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HOUSING DESEGREGATION INCREASES AS SCHOOLS
DESEGREGATE IN JEFFERSON COUNTY 7–9 (1977).
56. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 10.
57. See id. at 2–3, 6.
58. See id. at 28 (discussing the implementation problems in the 1982–83 year when twenty-five
schools were outside the enrollment guidelines, and continued racial identification existed in teacher
assignment patterns).
59. See Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 291, 311–12, 325.
60. See Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 73, 110–11 (suggesting portion of court-order was
lifted in 1980).
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abandoned.61 Instead the school district implemented a compromise, altering the
desegregation plan to include a magnet school choice plan.62
After the district court declared the school system unitary in 2000,63 JCPS
adopted a student assignment plan to maintain and encourage integration, as
well as maximize student choice, through a variety of mechanisms including
magnet schools, magnet programs, and voluntary transfers.64 At that time, the
school system was 34% black and about 66% white.65 Much like the mandatory
desegregation plan, the 2001 plan required that no school have a black student
enrollment of less than 15% or of more than 50%.66 Other aspects of the plan
mirrored the mandatory desegregation plan. JCPS created geographic attendance
zones, clustering schools in such a way as to achieve a student population within
the racial guidelines.67 JCPS also furthered these racial guidelines by managing
choice to magnet schools and to magnet programs, to which a student could
apply regardless of where they lived.68
Thus students were given choices within their cluster, as well as choices
about magnet school programs.69 JCPS administrators and principals determined
how to fulfill students’ choices based on student rankings of their preferences,
available space, and the racial guidelines.70 JCPS also operated schools known as
“traditional schools,” which offered the same curriculum as non-magnet schools,
but also emphasized a structured educational environment, discipline and dress
codes, and “concepts of courtesy, patriotism, morality and respect for others.”71
JCPS determined admission to the traditional schools primarily by a student’s
address and by a lottery system, but the racial guidelines operated here as well.72
JCPS separated applications into four lists (black male, white male, black female
and white female), and traditional school principals were allowed to draw
candidates from the different lists to stay within the racial guidelines for the
school.73

61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See generally Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000)
(dissolving the desegregation decree).
64. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
65. See Post-Hearing Brief For Defendants at 4, McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., No.
3:032-CV-620-H (W.D. Ky. Feb. 2, 2004).
66. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
67. See id. At the elementary level and middle school level, most students attend what is
effectively their neighborhood school (called a “resides school” under the plan). Id. at 842 n.10 (57%
of elementary students attend their resides school and 67.5% of middle schools attend their resides
schools). Slightly less than half of high school students (49.7%) attended their resides school. Id.
68. See id. at 843. JCPS operates thirteen magnet schools, eighteen magnet programs within
specialized schools, and twenty-two “optional programs” which are small, specialized programs
within regular schools. Id.
69. The choices are structured slightly differently at the elementary, middle, and high school
levels. See id. at 844–45.
70. Id. at 845.
71. Id. at 845–46. There are nine traditional schools (four elementary, three middle, and two high
schools) and two resides elementary schools that have traditional programs. Id.
72. See McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
73. See id. at 845–47.
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In 2003, several families challenged the 2001 JCPS plan as violating,
primarily, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. After holding a
five-day hearing in December 2003, the District Court sustained most of the 2001
plan, finding that JCPS had a compelling interest in voluntary integration.74 The
court found most components of the managed-choice plan to be narrowly
tailored to JCPS’s interest in furthering integration, but struck down the plan as
applied to the traditional schools.75 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling, writing
only a cursory opinion.76 JCPS abandoned its method of considering race for the
traditional program.77 By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2006,
only one plaintiff remained in the case.78
As is well known, the Supreme Court ruled that JCPS’s assignment program
(as well as that of the Seattle Unified School District) was unconstitutional.79 In
particular, a majority held that the voluntary integration programs before the
Court violated the Fourteenth Amendment. While four Justices (Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito) would forbid any voluntarily
adopted student assignment plans that rely on race,80 Justice Kennedy found that
integration was a compelling educational goal that a school district may
pursue.81 Thus, there were five votes—including the four Justices in dissent—for
allowing the use of race in student assignments, with Justice Kennedy’s opinion
ultimately controlling on when such programs would be considered narrowly
tailored.82
B. Lessons
In sum, JCPS’s 2001 integration plan was declared unconstitutional, and
thus is no more. All indications are that JCPS will endeavor to pursue racial
integration, but through other means.83 The point here is less to bemoan or
critique the Supreme Court’s decision, but rather to highlight, as a counter to the
cloak of despair that has surrounded the concept of school integration, what
made JCPS a relative success.
First was the regional, county-wide nature of the plan. As researchers have
long noted, county-wide plans are generally more successful because they
decrease the potential for white flight: there is literally less of an escape route

74. See id. at 837–38.
75. See id. at 855–56, 861–64.
76. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
77. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2749–51 (2007).
78. See id. at 2750 n.9.
79. See id. at 2760–61.
80. See id. at 2758 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
81. Id. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2792 (stating that school systems can pursue racial integration through a variety of
means other than individual racial classifications such as “strategic site selection,” “drawing
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods” and “recruiting
students and faculty in a targeted fashion”).
83. See http://www.jcpsky.net/AboutUs/StudentAssigPlan.html (describing new student
assignment plan); Emily Bazelon, The Next Kind of Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 20, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20integration-t.html (detailing Jefferson County’s
plan post- Parents Involved to consider class as well as race in student assignment).
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through out-migration, and enrollment in private schools is not an option for
many parents.84 There are certainly downsides to these plans, including the
dispersal of black political control over schools into a regional governance
system,85 but in terms of stabilizing integration, such plans have produced the
best results. In addition, there is some indication that the program’s regional
scope may have contributed to significant achievement gains by increasing not
just racial integration, but socioeconomic integration.86
In addition, community and civil rights groups, local governments, and the
school board exploited the county-wide feature of the plan to promote policies
that dismantled the city–suburb spatial divide between blacks and whites and
thus began to alter housing patterns. As mentioned above, the desegregation
remedy itself included individual incentives for housing integration—for
example, exempting attendance zones in adequately integrated communities
from busing. This had the effect of minimizing the need for busing which, along
with the racial guidelines capping the percentage of black children in a school,
might have diminished political resistance by whites to the plan. 87 The housing
integration incentives also decreased housing segregation: data through the early
1980s showed an increase in black residence in predominantly white
neighborhoods.88 In addition, civil rights organizations and the Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights intensified fair housing activity to complement
school desegregation.89 A particularly notable innovation was a joint program
between the Louisville and Jefferson County housing authorities to merge their
federal section 8 housing program to provide city residents access to housing
outside Louisville.90

84. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE BUS? 410–12 (1978); DIANA PEARCE, CTR. FOR NAT'L POL'Y
REV., BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: NEW EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF METROPOLITAN SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION ON HOUSING PATTERNS 10–12 (1980), available at http://eric.ed.gov/
ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED199309; Christine H. Rossell,
Desegregation Plans, Racial Isolation, White Flight, and Community Response, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 13–56, 47–49 (Christine H. Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983).
85. See ORFIELD, supra note 84, at 413–16 (discussing conflicting black attitudes toward
metropolitan desegregation).
86. See O’Dell, supra note 45, at 93–97.
87. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 26 (documenting a doubling of the black student
population in predominantly white Northeast and Jeffersontown areas of the county between 1974
and 1982); see also Gary Orfield, Segregated Housing and School Resegregation, in DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 325 (stating that the school district was able to exempt 32 schools
from busing by 1982 and number of students bused fell from 18,000 to 11,000 without affecting levels
of desegregation).
88. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 24–25.
89. See id. at 23 (discussing a 1975 fair housing campaign which used billboards, leaflets, and
bumper stickers to inform Jefferson County citizens how housing desegregation can lead to
neighborhood exemption from desegregation transportation); see also KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION SPURS FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN IN FORTY YEARS IN
LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY 19–21 (1980) (documenting housing desegregation between 1980
and 1984) [hereinafter FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN].
90. See SCHOOL AND HOUSING, supra note 51, at 24 (finding that one of every three black Section 8
families were able to relocate from the city to the county); FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN, supra
note 89, at 27 (attributing housing desegregation gains to section 8 program).
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Second, Jefferson County is noteworthy because of the role civic
organizations played in shaping the remedy and ensuring public support for the
various integration plans. A standard critique of public law reform litigation is
that it turns potential stakeholders into bystanders and leads to undue focus on
courts as the site of social change.91 Jefferson County’s integration efforts, in
contrast, appear to have been characterized by strong involvement of civic and
community organizations, and at times by effective partnerships with
government. Intermediary civil rights organizations were built into the remedy
stemming from the 1975 school integration order. To help implement the order,
the Louisville school system used federal grants from the Department of Health,
Employment and Welfare (HEW).92 These grants helped to fund workshops for
teachers; bus drivers and others employed in the school system; hotlines and
other efforts to educate the community; and a task force composed of civic and
religious organizations to promote peaceful desegregation.93 Through a small
grant, the Louisville Human Relations Commission was able to hire a project
director tasked with promoting desegregation.94
Then, in the years following court-ordered desegregation, the Louisville and
Jefferson County Human Relations Commission and the Kentucky Commission
on Human Rights actively built community support for the desegregation plan,
monitoring the county’s compliance with court orders, and evaluating the
integration plans for success along a range of dimensions (levels of integration as
well as student achievement levels).95 No doubt part of these organizations’
efforts can be traced to a handful of lively Louisville characters with strong
commitments to school and housing integration. For instance, Galen Martin, who
served as the executive director of the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights
from 1963 to 1989, and also served as head of the Fair Housing Council, was
renowned for his decades-long effort to promote school and housing integration
in Jefferson County.96
But Kentucky also possessed the organizational structures to enable this
individual and civic energy. Most notably, Kentucky had several wellestablished, publicly-funded organizations dedicated to civil rights enforcement
and advocacy. The Kentucky General Assembly had established the Kentucky
Human Rights Commission in 1960, several years before the federal Civil Rights

91. See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE 3 (1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 2027, 2043 n.73 (2008) (collecting sources articulating the “long-standing critique of ‘cause
lawyering’ . . . that it places too much faith in lawsuits and diverts energy from the political strategies
that are necessary to secure long-term social change”); see also id. at 2043, 2062–65 (discussing
contemporary public interest lawyers’ awareness of and responses to the limits of litigation).
92. See Perley, supra note 48, at 12. The HEW grants and Emergency School Aid grants totaled
$1,880,000. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 13.
95. See, e.g., FIRST HOUSING DESEGREGATION GAIN, supra note 89; KY. COMM’N ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, VESTIGES OF SEGREGATION REMAIN IN JEFFERSON COUNTY SCHOOLS (1977) (detailing the
shortcomings of desegregation attempts in Jefferson County).
96. See Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights, A Statement from the Human Rights Commission Upon the
Death of Galen Martin, Dec. 20, 2006, http://migration.kentucky.gov/Newsroom/kchr/
Galen+Martin+Death.htm.
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Act of 1964, to address discrimination, civil relations, and issues of inequity.97
Kentucky became the first southern state to pass its Civil Rights Act in 1966
forbidding discrimination in public accommodations, education, housing, and
other areas, and the Act granted the Kentucky Human Rights Commission
primary enforcement authority.98 Similarly, Louisville established the Louisville
Human Relations Commission in 1962.99 This Commission was formed to help
combat discrimination in education, employment, and housing in particular, and
was charged explicitly “to develop harmonious inter-group and interracial
relations” and “to enlist the support of civic, religious, labor, industrial and
commercial groups, and civic leaders dedicated to the improvement of intergroup and interracial relations and the elimination of discriminatory
practices.”100 The Louisville Commission later played a role in building civic and
parental support for the desegregation plan, as well as in monitoring the results.
None of these agencies came into being without effort. They were the product of
hard-fought battles led by Kentucky citizens promoting civil rights. Yet
Kentucky’s human rights infrastructure, among the first in a southern state,
likely helped to support the judicial mandates for desegregation.
A final and related factor that appeared to play a role in the relative success
of Jefferson County’s school integration efforts was the interaction of mandatory
and voluntary features in shaping of the program. Court-mandated
desegregation presents a conundrum. On the one hand, because political officials
can essentially shift blame for pursuing integration to courts, court-mandated
desegregation has in many cases proven more successful in terms of achieving
integration than those voluntarily adopted by political entities.101 Courts can set
deadlines and exact penalties for non-enforcement, which are often necessary to
force political actors to behave. On the other hand, court mandates can create
additional community resentment because of the judiciary’s perceived lack of
democratic accountability.102 In some sense, the existence of active intermediary
organizations in Jefferson County might have permitted some of the democratic
participation gained in voluntary programs, while court mandates provided an
incentive for political action.
The integration program had voluntary elements in another sense. As
mentioned above, as both black and white members of the Jefferson County
community began to resist busing, political officials increased the use of magnet
97. See Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights, Who We Are, http://kchr.ky.gov/about/aboutkchr.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2009) (discussing history of the Kentucky Human Relations Commission).
98. See id.
99. See Muse, supra note 38, at 7–8, 21–23. The Louisville Human Relations Commission was
established on March 27, 1962 by the Louisville Board of Aldermen, and with the backing of the
Mayor, after significant pressure from black citizens. See id. at 17–18.
100. Id. at 27; see also id. at 25, 30, 36–38 (describing early efforts to address employment equities,
housing discrimination and to prevent white flight from Louisville).
101. See Rossell, supra note 84, at 33; O’Dell, supra note 45, at 94–96.
102. See HOCHSCHILD & SCOVRONICK, supra note 30, at 33–34. Some studies also show greater
achievement gains in school systems that employ voluntary integration as compared to those in
which integration was mandated. See, e.g., Walter G. Stephan, Blacks and “Brown”: The Effects of School
Desegregation on Black Students, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT 131, 131–33, 153
(Thomas Cook et al. eds., 1984); Lawrence A. Bradley & Gifford W. Bradley, The Academic Achievement
of Black Students in Desegregated Schools: A Critical Review, 47 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 399, 417, 433 (1977).
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schools and magnet programs that seek to encourage integration without
mandated student assignment.103 After the system was declared unitary in 2001,
the choice elements of the plan increased. While the program continued to
mandate levels of integration, parents were given a choice of schools within a
cluster, as well as choices about educational programs in magnet schools and
programs (outside of the usual policy of assignment to neighborhood schools),
and in the majority of cases those choices were honored.104 Studies conducted in
Jefferson County shortly after institution of the 2001 plan showed overwhelming
support for the choice elements of the integration plan, and strong support
(seventy-seven percent of all respondents) for maintenance of the racial
guidelines to ensure racial integration.105 It may be that the choice elements of the
integration plan helped maintained political support by increasing overall
contentedness with the school system.
More broadly, choice programs suggest an answer to political resistance to
integration remedies. In something of a puzzle, studies consistently show high
public support for integration, but low support for integration remedies such as
busing.106 The simple answer may be that professed support for integration is
either insincere or shallow. But it also may be that remedies that incorporate
choice may be more politically palatable than those that rely on mandatory
assignment.107 The record of the JCPS case certainly contains some evidence to
support that view. The political success of the Jefferson County program
appeared as a rationale when the voluntary integration program was challenged
in district court.108 JCPS’s support for the program included expert testimony
that the 2001 plan in its use of choice and of racial guidelines made the schools
more attractive and generated community support for the school system.109 JCPS
did not make much of this argument in its briefs to the district court, but the
district court’s opinion, making use of the surveys and the testimony, expounded
on this rationale. According to the district court, the evidence supported JCPS’s
view that students were less likely to flee the public school system to private
schools because parents perceived the schools to be roughly equal.110 In effect,
the court concluded that the integration program helped to create a system

103. See Gary Orfield, Unexpected Costs and Uncertain Gains of Dismantling Desegregation, in
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION, supra note 7, at 110–11.
104. See McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 843–45 (JCPS operated
thirteen magnet schools, eighteen magnet programs within specialized schools, and twenty-two
“optional programs” which are small, specialized programs within regular schools. See id. at 843.
105. The survey by the University of Kentucky showed that 97% of parents supported school
choice, 82% believed that students benefit from attending racially integrated schools, and 77%
(including 89% of blacks) believed that schools should have guidelines to ensure racial diversity. See
Post-Hearing Brief of Defendants, supra note 65, at 6 (citing defense exhibits 37, 38).
106. See, e.g., Michael Murakami, Desegregation, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 34 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008); Percy Bates, Desegregation: Can We Get There
From Here?, PHI. DELTA KAPPAN, Sept., 1990, at 8.
107. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J.
2043, 2057 (2002) (discussing opposition to mandatory interdistrict school assignment policies).
108. See Post-Hearing Brief of Defendants, supra note 65, at 6.
109. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 107.
110. See McFarland , 330 F. Supp. at 834.
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where all residents felt invested in the public school system. According to the
court:
The [JCPS School Board] also believes that school integration benefits the system
as a whole by creating a system of roughly equal components, not one urban
system and another suburban system, not one rich and another poor, not one
Black and another White. It creates a perception, as well as the potential reality,
of one community of roughly equal schools.111

These statements suggest not just the political acceptance of the plan’s
choice elements, but a broader transformation from an era of racial segregation to
one in which all schools are deemed worthy of equal respect and concern.112 It is
difficult to empirically substantiate whether this transformation in the political
economy of schools happened in Jefferson County, but to the extent that it did, it
points to integration’s potentially deep connection to structural equity, which I
discuss in the next part.
C. Possibilities
Simply put, JCPS’s integration story shows that the quest for integration
need not be futile. None of this is to say, however, that JCPS’s integration plan
achieved perfection. One indication is that Jefferson County, despite decadeslong efforts, maintains patterns of housing segregation familiar to most
metropolitan areas, with blacks concentrated in the city and whites in the
surrounding suburbs.113 Louisville has features of many large urban cities,
including a declining population and a shrinking tax base.114 A perfectly
successful school integration plan would likely affect housing integration over
the short-term by disincentivizing people from choosing segregated
neighborhoods, and over the long-term by diminishing the bias and stigma that
might contribute to housing segregation. That this has not fully happened in

111. Id.
112. This is similar to Charles Lawrence’s argument that Brown “is not only about access to
resources; it is about the creation of community itself.” Charles Lawrence, Forbidden Conversations: On
Race, Privacy and Community (A Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114
YALE L.J. 1353, 1378 (2005). According to Lawrence:
[T]he affirmative act of integration, the movement from dual to unitary, is required for the
transformation from an established ideology and structure that excludes and demeans
black and brown children to one that values and cares for them as members of the larger
community. As the community's chosen instrument for the creation and nurture of mutual
relationships and the transmission of values, culture, and knowledge, ‘public’ education
creates community and defines its bounds. The transformation of society envisioned by
Brown cannot be achieved when the location of societal transformation is not held in public
trust.
Id. Similarly, James Liebman has described the wrongs of school segregation as rooted in “legislative
racism.” See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1541, 1617–18 (describing “legislative racism” as race-based
“political judgments about how organized society should allocate scarce resources, educational and
otherwise”).
113. See Cummings & Price, supra note 37, at 620–22.
114. See id. Between 1960 and 1990, Louisville’s population declined by thiry-one percent while
the population in Jefferson County grew by eighty percent. Id. at 622. A majority of the black
population of Jefferson County lives in Louisville; and in 1990, blacks constituted only nine percent of
the population in Jefferson County outside of Louisville. See id.
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Louisville and Jefferson County is one indicator of the qualified nature of what
we call “success.”
Yet, the substantial successes of Jefferson County’s integration efforts are
worth noting for more than retrospection. To the extent that Justice Kennedy’s
opinion leaves room for schools to pursue integration, it matters that school
systems and advocates for integration are able to argue that integration efforts
are not inherently counterproductive or doomed. The implications are probably
greatest for domains outside schools, such as housing, where policy discussions
about the desirability of racial integration in housing continue.
II. INTEGRATION AS EQUITY
At a basic level, it seems strange to examine racial integration’s connection
to equity as if it presents a novel argument. After all, Brown was fundamentally
about ensuring equal educational opportunity for black students.115 Yet today,
some argue that Brown and the racial integration rationale encapsulated a
particular ideal about racial equity and inequity that is outmoded.116 The Brown
view of the harm caused by segregation, one might argue, depends on social
meanings associated with state-sanctioned segregation. Once the state sanction is
removed, the negative meaning becomes less salient. Thus, in contemporary
popular discourse, the quest for racial integration seems not only irrelevant to
quality learning for black children, but also, possibly denigrating to blacks: “Why
do black children have to sit next to white children to learn?”
As others have noted, this conception disregards Brown’s fundamental
notion of equal citizenship: that, at least in this country’s historical context,
separation had meant a subjugation that is fundamentally at odds with equal
citizenship.117 But Brown’s reliance on empirical evidence about the psychological
harm of segregation rather invited this caricature. Then, in the years following
Brown, the empirical evidence on integration showed only modest academic
gains for black students.118
Against this backdrop, the empirical evidence presented by integration
advocates in Parents Involved reframed the arguments for integration’s benefits
and segregation’s harms, connecting racial segregation’s harms explicitly to the
school deficits it produces, and connecting racial integration’s benefits not only
to short-term academic gains, but to long-term social capital gains for minorities.
This empirical evidence permits us to understand with greater specificity, albeit
still imperfectly, the mechanisms by which segregation signals and produces
harm in schooling today, as well as the role integration can play in producing

115. See Liebman, supra note 29, at 1485–88 (discussing equal educational opportunity rationales
for Brown but arguing that these rationales are rejected in later court desegregation decisions).
116. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2.
117. See C. Edwin Baker, Neutrality, Process and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal
Protection, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1030–48 (1980); Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation
Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1960); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court—1975 Term, Foreword: In Defense
of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7, 34–36, 42 (1976); Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme
Court—1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(1977).
118. See infra text accompanying notes 137–38.
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academic and longer term societal gains for minority students. As acknowledged
above, these empirical arguments were not sufficient to allow the Court to
sustain the programs at issue in Parents Involved. But they might still matter in
the significant space that the opinion leaves for exploration of racial integration
in schools and in housing.
A. The Ecology of Inequality
In Parents Involved, plaintiffs and their amici articulated the familiar interests
in reducing prejudice and improving students’ preparation to live and work in a
racially and ethnically diverse society. Yet the plaintiffs also sought to focus on
the precise harms of racially segregated schools to minority achievement.119 As
Goodwin Liu has recently noted, there are “difficult methodological challenges”
to documenting the relationship between racial segregation and educational
inequity.120 The harm to educational attainment that plaintiffs emphasized in the
Parents Involved litigation, and that gained emphasis by advocates in the years
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, centers on the connection between racially
segregated schools and poverty concentration.121 This empirical claim received
the most attention in the lower court arguments in the challenge to the Seattle
voluntary integration plan. In that case, the district also urged an interest, which
was not emphasized in the Jefferson County litigation, in avoiding the harms of
racially concentrated schools.122 Finding a compelling interest in avoiding racial
isolation, the court credited research showing that high-minority schools are
more likely to have high rates of poverty than are predominantly white schools,
and that along with those “high-rates of poverty come lower average test scores,
lower levels of student achievement with less-qualified teachers and fewer
advanced courses.”123 While some high-minority, high-poverty schools do not
have these characteristics, the court found that such schools were exceptions.124

119. See NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND ET AL., LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K-12 SCHOOL
INTEGRATION 12–14, 15–17 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/
voluntary/Voluntary_K-12_School_Integration_Manual.pdf. See infra text accompanying notes 125–
27.
120. See Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CAL L. REV. 277, 292–93 (2007) (discussing studies
that separate “the effect of school racial composition from the influence of students’ social
background and other school and nonschool determinants of learning” and which find strong
negative relationships between achievement in particular areas and the percentage of black
enrollment).
121. See infra text accompanying notes 125–27.
122. The district presented evidence that because of racially segregated housing patterns in
Seattle, the use of a neighborhood school assignment policy would result in segregated schools. See
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
123. See id.
124. See id. (citing ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., A
MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 11 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf).
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The harms of concentrated poverty were presented in both the plaintiffs’
briefs and the briefs of amici to the Supreme Court in Parents Involved.125 In short,
the plaintiffs presented evidence that these schools have fewer educational
resources: in particular, less rich curricula, larger class sizes, poorer facilities,
poorer quality teachers and—because of their low-income student population—
more educational needs.126 Much of this evidence derives from research that is of
recent vintage, reflecting recent efforts by educational researchers to understand
the ways in which race and class interact to maintain inequality in schools.127
At first glance, to understand the harm of segregation in terms of
“concentrated poverty” might seem to be less about race than about income or
class. Yet such a conclusion would oversimplify the peculiar operation of race in
our society, as well as the inseparable confluence of race and poverty. For one
thing, some of the problems associated with low-income schools are exacerbated
in high-minority schools. Teacher quality is perhaps the most powerful example.
Numerous studies have found that teachers play a significant role in promoting
student achievement.128 Yet high-minority schools tend to have a greater
proportion of inexperienced teachers than predominantly white schools.129 They
also possess teachers who are less-qualified, and experience high teacher
turnover.130 Studies have shown that race—rather than working conditions,
student poverty, or teacher salary—seems to account for teacher mobility.131
Second, not only are some of the observed deleterious effects of racial
isolation associated with the race variable, and not simply with poverty, but the
entire condition of poverty concentration exists primarily for blacks and Puerto

125. See, e.g., Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
2927079, *10–12.
126. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND
EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY (2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/
deseg/deseg05.php.
127. See, e.g., SUSAN EATON, THE CHILDREN IN ROOM E4: AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL 343
(2006) (noting that much of the evidence on the effects of concentrated poverty and segregation as
well as the benefits of integration began to be generated in the 1990s).
128. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SANDERS & JUNE C. RIVERS, CUMULATIVE AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF
TEACHERS ON FUTURE STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 6–7 (1996), available at http://
www.mccsc.edu/~curriculum/cumulative%20and%20residual%20effects%20of%20teachers.pdf; S.
Paul Wright, Sandra P. Horn & William L. Sanders, Teacher and Classroom Context Effects on Student
Achievement: Implications for Teacher Evaluation, 11 J. PERSONNEL EVAL. IN EDUC. 57, 63–66 (1997).
129. See PATRICK M. SHIELDS ET AL., CTR. FOR THE FUTURE OF TEACHING AND LEARNING, THE
STATUS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION 24 (2005); SUSANNA LOEB & MICHELLE REININGER, EDUC. POLICY
CTR., PUBLIC POLICY AND TEACHER LABOR MARKETS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY IT MATTERS i–iii
(2004); Linda Darling-Hammond, The Color Line in American Education: Race, Resources, and Student
Achievement, 1 DU BOIS REV. 213, 218–19 (2004); Catherine Freeman, Benjamin Scafidi, & David
Sjoquist, Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994–2001: Trends, Causes and Impact on Teacher
Quality, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 148 (John C. Boger & Gary Orfield
eds., 2005).
130. See JENNIFER B. PRESLEY, BRADFORD R. WHITE, & YUQIN GONG, EXAMINING THE DISTRIBUTION
AND IMPACT OF TEACHER QUALITY IN ILLINOIS 17–18 (2005); Susanna Loeb, Linda Darling-Hammond,
& John Luczak, How Teaching Conditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEABODY J. OF
EDUC. 3, 44, (2005); Benjamin Scafidi et al., Race, Poverty and Teacher Mobility, 26 ECON. EDUC. REV. 145,
149, 157–58 (2007); see also Liu, supra note 120, at 295–98.
131. See Scafidi et al., supra note 130, at 157–58.
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Ricans.132 This poverty concentration is not simply the result of higher rates of
poverty among these groups, but is also the result of racial discrimination in
private housing markets, and federal, state, and local housing policy that has the
effect of creating racially segregated, low-income ghettos.133 For the most part,
poor white Americans do not live in neighborhoods of high poverty
concentration.134 While poor whites might experience all the significant
constraints associated with poverty, they are more likely to live in
neighborhoods that provide them access to middle-class schools and other
resources.135 In addition, the poverty levels of schools correlate strongly with
race. Because of the effects of residential segregation and other factors, black
middle-class students tend to live in communities and attend schools with higher
concentrations of poverty than their white counterparts.136
B. Long Term Benefits as Social Capital
Early desegregation research showed only a modest positive impact on
African-American achievement as measured by test scores. These early studies
found modest positive gains in reading for black students, but no effect on math
scores.137 There may be convincing explanations for these tepid results. Many of
these studies were conducted in the very early years of desegregation and failed
to account for the school conditions and context surrounding desegregation,
including community resistance to desegregation, hostility by white teachers, the
existence of within-school tracking, the age at which black students had been
integrated, and whether the desegregation plans were voluntary or courtordered.138
Given this research, as a matter of strategy integration advocates might
simply shift emphasis to benefits better supported by the empirical evidence:
that school integration produces beneficial long-term effects for both black and
white students in terms of racial attitudes and ability to interact with those of

132. See, e.g., MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 118–25, 144; see also id. at 114 (describing studies
showing higher levels of housing discrimination faced by dark-skinned Hispanics as compared to
those with lighter-skin).
133. See infra text accompanying note 5.
134. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 8, at 118, 124–25, 130.
135. See id. at 125, 130.
136. See Erica Frankenberg, Introduction: School Integration—The Time is Now, in LESSONS IN
INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 9.
137. See, e.g., David J. Armor, The Evidence on Desegregation and Black Achievement, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 129, at 43, 58; Norman Miller & Michael
Carlson, School Desegregation as a Social Reform: A Meta-Analysis of its Effects on Black Academic
Achievement, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND BLACK ACHIEVEMENT, supra note 102, at 89, 96, 104.
138. See Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 66–67. Several later
studies on academic achievement during desegregation were able to identify some of the conditions
that helped produce achievement gains. For instance, greater achievement gains occurred when
blacks were integrated into schools with better teachers, stronger curricula, and higher expectations
for students. See id. at 68; Gary Orfield, Foreword, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 2
(describing segregated classes, discriminatory teacher assignment, discriminatory counseling, and
other conditions limiting the social and academic experiences of students in the early years of
desegregation); Crain & Mahard, supra note 12, at 17, 18, 34.
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other races.139 The Supreme Court’s emphasis on diversity in the higher
education affirmative action context might also have encouraged researchers to
focus on the benefits of integrated environments to white students, and towards
the reduction of racial stereotypes.140 In many ways, Justice O’Connor’s opinion
in Grutter articulated a much more robust view of the diversity rationale, one
connected to fundamental structural arrangements in our democracy.141
Yet to rely on the affirmative action jurisprudence’s articulation of diversity
benefits—usually conceived as improvements to interracial understanding,
classroom discussion, and critical thinking skills—would forgo establishing an
empirical basis for what many of us know anecdotally: that minorities who
experience great socioeconomic mobility or who gain access to elite universities
and other elite settings are more likely to have gone to integrated schools. It also
invites a concept of integration as unconcerned about black achievement—much
as Justice Thomas expressed in his opinion in Parents Involved when he
concluded integration was not about black achievement gains—but rather with
elitist arguments for cultural diversity.142
The research on long-term effects of school desegregation on graduates also
bears a non-speculative relation to educational achievement for minorities. In
particular, data suggests that minorities who attend integrated schools are not
simply gaining changes in attitudes or the ability to get along with others of
different races, they also gain great life successes. For example, researchers Amy
Stuart Wells and Robert Crain have reviewed a number of studies finding that,
controlling for variables such as test scores, and socioeconomic status, AfricanAmerican graduates of desegregated high schools earned higher degrees—and
eventually gained more social mobility and income—than graduates of
segregated high schools.143

139. Cf. Janet W. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations, A Review of the Literature,
17 REV. RES. EDUC. 335, 339 (1991) (encouraging shift away from research focused on academic
achievement to research on the effect of desegregation on intergroup relations).
140. See Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 15 (describing evidence supporting diversity in higher
education which was marshaled for the Grutter and Gratz cases); ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 13 (2006) (describing research on educational benefits
of diversity spawned by Justice Powell’s articulation of the diversity interest in Bakke).
141. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003). The majority opinion in Grutter, by
Justice O’Connor, contends that racial diversity improves classroom interactions, but also that it
ensures the democratic legitimacy of our institutions. Id. As Justice O’Connor puts the point: “In
order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the
path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.
All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the
educational institutions that provide this training.” Id. at 332. For a discussion of Justice O’Connor’s
expansion of Bakke’s notion of “diversity,” see Lani Gunier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 175 (2003) (contending that
Justice O’Connor’s “opinion for the Court affirmed that the conversation about racial diversity
extends beyond the classroom to include the fundamental role of public education in a democracy”).
142. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2776–77 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (2007); see also Ryan, supra note 15, at 131 (noting these arguments).
143. See Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School
Desegregation, 64 REV. RES. EDUC. 531, 552 (1994); see also Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M.
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunities, 43 J. SOC.
ISS. 5, 9–12 (1987).
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The mechanics that produce these effects are less than clear. As several
researchers have noted, the findings on long-term effects indicate little about
“how and why these outcomes occurred in desegregated high schools.”144 Jomills
Braddock has described school integration as a counter to “perpetuation theory,”
a term Braddock coined in 1980 to explain that blacks who have been raised in
segregated settings will tend to avoid integrated settings because they anticipate
hostility.145 Braddock, Wells, and Crain have also suggested that integrated
schools might lead to peer and adult networks that provide information about
educational and employment opportunities, and that are necessary to promote
socioeconomic mobility in our society.146 Closely related mechanisms that might
explain how integration improves long-term outcomes are employers’ greater
comfort with applicants who have attended majority white schools, and the
reputation of majority white schools among employers and higher education
institutions.147 While more needs to be known about how integrated schools and
integrated peer networks operate in this context, what Wells and Crain have
described is an enhancement of social capital—a term I use broadly to mean the
resources and networks necessary for educational and social development.148 The
emphasis here is not simply on improvement of interracial cooperation, but on
the improvement of life chances and social mobility through the networks
developed in integrated settings.
It may be that data about social capital benefits will have limited ability to
link racial integration to contemporary questions of racial equity. Much like the
citizenship benefits from interracial contact, these social capital benefits require
one to look beyond educational achievement as measured by test scores, to the
role of schools in disrupting segregation patterns and in producing longer-term
social equity and inclusion for blacks. As the asserted mission of schools narrows
to test score achievement, social capital arguments may do no better job of
resuscitating public support for integration, just as the citizenship benefits
achieved through interracial contact are not seen as related to the purposes of

144. Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 69.
145. See Jomills Henry Braddock II, The Perpetuation of Segregation Across Levels of Education: A
Behavorial Assessment of the Contact-Hypothesis, 53 SOC. EDUC. 178, 179, 181 (1980).
146. See Wells & Crain, supra note 143, at 552.
147. See, e.g., id.; see also Wells et al., How Society Failed School Desegregation, supra note 5, at 69.
148. See Glenn Loury, Essays in the Theory of the Distribution of Income 20 (May 17, 1976)
(unpublished dissertation on file with author) (encouraging the consideration of “social capital”—
“the consequences of social position in facilitating individual acquisition of (say) the standard human
capital characteristics”—in understanding income differences between whites and AfricanAmericans); Glenn Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, 12 J.
ECON. PERSP. 117, 199–20 (1998) (discussing effects of social networks in limiting employment
opportunities for blacks). I acknowledge some risk in abusing the term “social capital,” which has a
variety of overlapping meanings in the political science and sociological literature. See, e.g., Robert
Putnam, Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. &
POLS. 664, 664–65 (1995) (describing social capital as “features of social life—networks, norms and
trust—that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”); ROBERT
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 19–23 (2001) (describing development of the term social capital); Alejandro
Portes, Social Capital And Its Origins In Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 2 (1994) (stating that the
term “social capital” is “being put to severe tests by . . . increasingly diverse application” and that the
term simply embodies a “staple notion” in sociology that “involvement and participation in groups
can have positive consequences for the individual and the community”).
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education.149 Further strengthening of social capital arguments would require a
better understanding of the relation between traditional short-term measures of
achievement and the long-term social capital achievement measures. This
understanding might shed light on the past and the future of school integration
in Jefferson County itself. Integration, as discussed earlier, was relatively
successful in Jefferson County as measured by levels of school integration, initial
achievement score gains, and the long-term effects on graduates,150 but a
significant racial achievement gap, though narrowed, still remains.151
Looking at the social capital benefits for minorities who attend integrated
schools also might allow us to revisit and reframe the citizenship benefits gained
by interracial contact as capable of addressing racial inequality. If, as in
Braddock’s account, African-Americans attending integrated schools gain a
comfort that permits them to function more broadly in integrated settings, then
whites also gain benefits in the reduction of their prejudice and greater comfort
and contact with blacks and other minorities.152 One might hope, then, that
“perpetuation” operates for whites as well, with ramifications for racial equity.
Greater comfort in integrated settings might increase movement towards racial
integration in schools, housing, and employment, as well as increasing
willingness to support policies that aid minorities and which might alter
structural racial arrangements.
C. Integration Imperatives
Given that the equity-related arguments for racial integration did not
persuade the Court, the question going forward is the continuing relevance of
the equity framework to broader, contemporary policy discussions on racial
integration. In my view, the equity-based arguments in Parents Involved could
remain powerful if shifted to correspond to the current policy—as opposed to
litigation—environment.
In the Parents Involved litigation, empirical evidence on integration’s
relationship to educational and social equity was introduced to make the case
that integration was a compelling interest.153 The framing of this empirical
149. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 144 (arguing that benefits of intergroup cooperation and prejudice
reduction “are no longer included in most conversations about the mission of public schools”).
150. See Amy S. Wells et al., Refusing to Leave Desegregation Behind: From Graduates of Racially
Diverse Schools to the Supreme Court, 110 TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 12 (2008) (qualitative study of
seventeen graduates of integrated high schools in Jefferson County reporting greater comfort in
integrated settings than their peers, which they believe enhanced their ability to participate in a
global economy); see also Brief of Profs. Amy Stuart Wells et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos.
05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2927074, * 17 (citing this study among other studies showing benefits of
integration).
151. See COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCHOOLS, BEATING THE ODDS VIII, CITY-BY-CITY PROFILES,
http://www.cgcs.org/BTO7/Jefferson.pdf (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, COMMON CORE OF DATA PUBLIC ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY SCHOOL UNIVERSE SURVEY
(2006)) (showing an increase in the reading and math proficiency of black fourth graders between
2001 and 2006 but that a black-white achievement gap of more than 20 points remains).
152. See, e.g., Frankenberg, supra note 15, at 16–17.
153. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2821–22 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing social science supporting integration as a compelling governmental interest).
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evidence to ward off an equal protection challenge—and to satisfy narrow
tailoring—need not constrain future policy discussions on exploring integration’s
current relevance and efficacy.
To argue that racial integration must be connected to questions of structural
equity is not to suggest that racial integration is a requirement for educational
gains for minority students. It may be, as some integration advocates urge
outside the strictures of equal protection litigation, that integration is the only
route to substantial educational gains for disadvantaged minorities: that other
school reforms will be unsuccessful without racial integration.154 Yet to adopt
this view, integration advocates must grapple more directly with what Jim Ryan
notes is education policy’s move away from racial integration to questions of
“school funding, public school choice, charter schools, vouchers, standards and
testing, and universal access to preschool,”155 as well as the fact that some of
these other policy interventions are bearing fruit for minority children.156
Strategies to achieve racial integration may be complimentary with many of
these other interventions, such as improvements in teacher quality and access to
preschools, but it stands in greater tension with some charter school reforms
directed at poor students in particular.
Some charter schools appear not only to consider integration irrelevant to
their model, they also advance educational approaches that assume that different
educational interventions (such as increased school time) might be required to
produce educational improvements for low-income minority students as
opposed to middle-class students. I do not pretend to resolve these debates on
educational imperatives, which appear to be in dispute even among educational
policy experts. Rather, I contend that one might justify integration on educational
and socioeconomic equity grounds, and still leave room for other interventions
targeted at underachieving minority children.
In the policy (as opposed to litigation) context, racial integration must
address arguments that socioeconomic integration provides an alternative to race
based assignment.157 In the equal protection argument of the school districts,
socioeconomic integration was cast as an inadequate alternative because it would

154. See Orfield, Forward, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 6.
155. See Ryan, supra note 15, at 142–43.
156. See, e.g., Janet Currie, Early Childhood Intervention Programs: What Do We Know?, 15 J. ECON.
PERSP. 212 (2001); Jens Ludwig & Douglas L. Miller, Does Head Start Improve Children’s Life Chances?
Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design, 122 QUAR. J. ECON. 159 (2007). The overall success of
charter school interventions as compared to public schools is mixed. See NAT’L CTR FOR EDUC. STAT.,
A CLOSER LOOK AT CHARTER SCHOOLS USING HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING vi (2006) (analyzing
2004 and 2006 data and finding that traditional public schools outperform charter schools on reading
and math standardized tests). Some charter schools, most famously the Knowledge is Power Program
Schools (KIPP) have shown significant success in improving test scores of urban, mostly black
students. See Steven M. Ross et al., Achievement and Climate Outcomes for the Knowledge is Power
Program in an Inner-City Middle School, 12 J. OF EDUC. FOR STUD. PLACED AT RISK, 137, 137 (2007). While
charter school admission is lottery-based, rigorous programs may select out less motivated or
prepared students and their families. See Erik W. Robelen, KIPP Success Cited, With Caveats, EDUC.
WEEK., Nov. 12, 2008.
157. See, e.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, CENTURY FOUNDATION, RESCUING BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 3 (2007) (discussing socioeconomic integration as a response to the Parents Involved
decision).
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not produce racial integration.158 But in the larger policy debates this argument is
less adequate. If higher levels of poverty are a chief harm of racially segregated
schools, then this is one that socioeconomic integration would appear to directly
address. With socioeconomic integration as an option, racial integration appears
necessary only to promote intergroup cooperation benefits, benefits that have
political limitations.
One response might be the increased production of research (such as the
teacher quality data referenced earlier) to show how race functions apart from
income to maintain inequality. One might also encourage increased attention, as
discussed earlier, to the mechanisms that produce long-term benefits and social
capital gains for graduates of racially integrated schools. But even these efforts
are unlikely to account for the complex ways in which race operates, and thus
suggest the limits of any empirical argument for racial integration. The complex
functioning of racial inequality—which serves to limit social mobility and to
stigmatize159—is not easy to quantify. Also, the benefits of racial integration, in
transforming opportunities for previously disadvantaged minorities, and the
political economy of concern for the problems of minorities might similarly elude
empirical analysis.
Finally, if racial integration appears to be waning in terms of school district
support for race-based student assignment policies, more emphasis should be
put on the problem of residential segregation and the socioeconomic
fragmentation of metropolitan areas.160 Indeed, Parents Involved, by decreasing
the range of constitutional school integration policies, would seem to shift
attention to the problem of residential segregation. School reform advocates
might be less focused on school integration today, but rich debates and
commentary continue in the housing field where claims of residential
segregation’s harms often center on its deleterious effects on school quality and
minority educational achievement.161
Addressing residential segregation, however, should not be mistaken for
the simpler course of action. The factors contributing to residential segregation
are many, including past and present government policy, discrimination in
private markets, and exclusionary zoning, and though there is no dearth of
policy proposals to address the problem, insufficient progress has been made on

158. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127
S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2944684, at * 47–48 (discussing inadequacy of raceneutral alternatives such as socioeconomic integration).
159. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL DIVIDE 98 (2001) (discussing the
“social structure of inequality”); GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 92–93, 160,
166 (2002) (discussing stigma as a way to understand persistent inequality); see R.A. Lenhardt,
Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004) (arguing
that racial stigma rather than intentional discrimination should be seen as the main source of racial
harm).
160. For recent discussions of both, see generally SEGREGATION, THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA
(James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008); THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY (Xavier De Souza
Briggs ed., 2005).
161. See, e.g., Xavier De Souza Briggs, More Pluribus, Less Unum?: The Changing Geography of Race
and Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 160, at 29–34.

Johnson_cxns.doc (Do Not Delete)

6/22/2009 3:48:31 PM

INTEGRATION, RECONSTRUCTED

45

increasing housing integration.162 Moreover, residential segregation cannot
simply be described as the cause of school segregation. Rather, the relationship
between school and housing segregation is one of mutual dependence. Families
with resources choose neighborhoods based on the racial and ethnic composition
of the schools, the percentage of poor students, as well as the actual and
perceived quality of those schools.163 Real estate agents market neighborhoods on
the basis of schools, and often accomplish racial steering by directing prospective
homeowners based on the racial and ethnic composition of the neighborhood’s
schools.164 For these reasons and more, the demographic group most resistant to
racial integration in housing consists of families with school-age children.165 At
the same time, racial integration and improving school quality can promote
racial and socioeconomic integration. Much data shows that the stability of
integration in neighborhoods depends in part on the stability and extent of the
integration in schools,166 and incompletely desegregated school systems can
exacerbate residential segregation.167 This mutually dependent relationship
between school and housing segregation suggests the need for increased
attention to the ways in which housing and school policies interact to reinforce
segregation as well as to decrease quality school and housing opportunities for
too many poor minorities.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it may be easier to argue that integration matters for equity than
to figure out how to achieve it—given what the Supreme Court’s school
desegregation law has bequeathed us, and given current patterns of residential
segregation. After all, while Jefferson County shows that integration is not
necessarily futile, many of the most promising reforms have occurred in
metropolitan school districts. If the integration conversation is to remain alive, it
162. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA: KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S
ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 165 (2006) (despairing that the federal government is unlikely
to meaningfully address residential segregation).
163. See Erica Frankenberg, The Impact of School Segregation on Residential Housing Patterns, in
SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK? 164 (2005) [hereinafter Residential Housing
Patterns]; Jennifer Jellison Holme, Buying Homes, Buying Schools: School Choice and the Social
Construction of School Quality, 72 HARV. EDUC. REV. 177 (2002) (study finding that high-status (white
and wealthy) parents tend to move to white school districts or closer to predominantly white schools
because of the information gained from social networks about the quality schools).
164. See PEARCE, supra note 84, at 10–12.
165. See Ingrid Gould Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become During the 1990s?, in FRAGILE RIGHTS
WITHIN CITIES 137 (John Goering ed., 2008).
166. See, e.g., PEARCE, supra note 84, at 4 (1980) (finding that metropolitan school desegregation
“not only unhooks school racial composition from neighborhood composition . . . [i]t also neutralizes
and may even reverse the incentives in the housing market”); INST. ON RACE AND POVERTY, MINORITY
SUBURBANIZATION, STABLE INTEGRATION, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN FIFTEEN METROPOLITAN
REGIONS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.irpumn.org/uls/resources/projects/Minority
_Suburbanization_full_report_032406.pdf (study of fifteen metropolitan areas finding more stable
residential integration in regions that employed large-scale busing for school integration from 1980 to
2000).
167. See Frankenberg, Residential Housing Patterns, supra note 163, at 165, 181 (finding that where a
large proportion of racially identifiable schools remain in a school system it can contribute to greater
levels of residential segregation).
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is likely to reside in efforts that address residential segregation and that link
housing to schools: in promoting school reform policies that encourage racial
integration, and in establishing housing policies that stabilize integration in both
housing and schools. This article’s contribution is less to answer all the questions
about how this task should be accomplished—although we have many good
models to point the way, including linking mixed income housing development
to school reform efforts, and ensuring that the siting of subsidized housing
promotes school integration168—but to urge that racial integration remains in the
national conversation about how to address contemporary racial inequity.

168. See generally JOHN A. POWELL ET AL., COMMUNITIES OF OPPORTUNITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR A
MORE
EQUITABLE
AND
SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE
FOR
ALL
(2007),
available
at
http://kirwaninstitute.org/publicationspresentations/publications/index.php
(detailing
the
“Communities of Opportunity” framework, which proposes to fix disparities through fair housing
and community development); Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and Education: The
Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 125, 134–44 (James H. Carr ed.,
2008) (discussing federal, state, and local policy interventions to link school and housing reform);
Frankenberg, Residential Housing Patterns, supra note 163, at 178 (noting efforts in Charlotte
Mecklenburg county to link housing and school policy, including by ensuring that public housing is
located in areas that help promote integration in schools).

